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ARTICLES
Moving Toward Law: Refocusing the Federal
Courts' Plain Error Doctrine in Criminal Cases
DUSTIN D. BERGER'
This article examines the plain error doctrine in criminal cases in
the federal courts. An examination of the earliest plain error cases
shows the federal courts' concern that, without the authority to
address errors not preserved with a contemporaneous objection, fed-
eral courts would affirm convictions and sentences that were either
wrongful or unfair. But the plain error doctrine that the federal courts
now employ, as announced in United States v. Olano, is poorly suited
to discovering and correcting even the serious errors that the plain
error doctrine was intended to remedy. Because the doctrine is discre-
tionary and fact-specific, it fails to generate precedents to guide
future courts and litigants and perpetuates a guilt-based approach to
evaluating errors. Moreover, Olano's four-pronged test leads appel-
late courts away from the most critical inquiry: Did the error under-
mine the fairness and reliability of the defendant's conviction and
sentence? This article proposes a new formulation of the plain error
doctrine that addresses these problems.
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"Rules of practice and procedure are devised to promote the ends of
justice, not to defeat them.... Orderly rules of procedure do not require
sacrifice of the rules of fundamental justice."
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional view among lawyers and jurists is that the appellate
court's role is to ensure the trial court "properly resolved" the case
before it.3 Under this view, the appellate court exists to correct errors
that occurred in proceedings before a lower court.4 The appellate court
fulfills its role by "subjecting the correctness of the rulings of the court
below to that careful examination which the discharge of [its] duty
require[s]."'
In the context of the direct appeal of a criminal conviction, an
appellate court's review is "the final guarantor of the fairness of the
criminal process."6 Indeed, "[r]eversal on appeal is the quality control
mechanism of the criminal justice system."7 Without the error correction
mechanism that appellate courts provide, trial courts would exercise
"absolute" and "unreviewable" power over the disposition of criminal
defendants' cases.8 Even though there is no federal constitutional right
to an appeal of a criminal conviction, 9 the notion of the appeal is now so
2. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941).
3. Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 10
(1991); see also Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1098 (Colo. 2010) ("Ensuring fundamental
fairness in trial is the beacon of plain error review."); Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative
Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope
of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. RaV. 993, 993 (1986)
(noting that the "primary function" of appellate courts is "to review for error determinations made
at the trial level").
4. See Lester B. Orfield, The Scope of Appeal in Criminal Cases, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 825, 840
(1936).
5. Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 660 (1896); see also Orfield, supra note 4, at 840
("The business of appellate courts is conceived of as being not to consider cases on their merits
but to correct the errors of the trial court.").
6. David Rossman, "Were There No Appeal": The History of Review in American Criminal
Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 518 (1990).
7. Id. at 519; see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he reversal rate of criminal convictions on mandatory appeals in the state courts,
while not overwhelming, is certainly high enough to suggest that depriving defendants of their
right to appeal would expose them to an unacceptable risk of erroneous conviction.").
8. Rossman, supra note 6, at 519.
9. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 & n.3 (1977); McKane v. Durston, 153
U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894) ("It is, therefore, clear that the right of appeal may be accorded by the
State to the accused upon such terms as in its wisdom may be deemed proper.... [W]hether an
appeal should be allowed, and if so, under what circumstances or on what conditions, are matters
for each State to determine for itself."). But see Jones, 463 U.S. at 756 n.1 (Brennan, J.,
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fundamental to the operation of our criminal justice system that "a right
of appeal is now universal for all significant criminal convictions."" °
Empirical data confirm that the criminal justice system needs a
robust mechanism for identifying and correcting trial errors. One recent
study of the error rate in criminal convictions for capital rape-murder
cases in the 1980s concluded that our system convicted innocent people
at a rate of somewhere between 3.3% and 5%." If the system errs this
frequently when trying the kinds of serious crime that demand the high-
est scrutiny from trial courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel,12 it is
logical to assume it errs even more frequently in cases involving lesser
scrutiny, such as theft, battery, or drug trafficking. These errors are also
worrisome because one consequence of convicting an innocent person is
that a guilty person remains free to continue to commit crimes.
13
It may once have been true that a "fair" criminal justice system was
the best we could hope for because we had no way to measure the accu-
racy of the system. Now that we know the system is less reliable than we
once thought, 4 it is imperative to improve our system's ability to detect
and correct the errors that lead to incorrect convictions.
True, appellate review-because it focuses on ensuring compliance
with the law and procedural rules-may not be the best tool for cor-
recting every cause of incorrect convictions. For instance, according to
data on the Innocence Project's website, the leading cause of wrongful
dissenting) (speculating that defendants are entitled to "at least some opportunity for review of
convictions, whether through the familiar mechanism of appeal or through some form of collateral
proceeding").
10. Jones, 463 U.S. at 757 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also James E. Lobsenz, A
Constitutional Right to an Appeal: Guarding Against Unacceptable Risks of Erroneous
Conviction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 375, 376 (1985). Some states constitutionally guarantee
criminal defendants the opportunity to appeal. Id. at 376-77. Professor Rossman also suggests
that, even before criminal defendants had a right to appeal their convictions, there were other
judicial safeguards to ensure the reliability of the judgment of conviction. See generally Rossman,
supra note 6, at 528-37.
11. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful
Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRAI. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 780 (2007).
12. See Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 198 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Capital cases are
given especially close scrutiny at every level, which is why in most cases many years elapse
before the sentence is executed.").
13. See Evan Whitton, America's English-Style Legal System Evolved to Conceal Truth, Not
Reveal It, ATLANTIC (June 14, 2012, 7:31 AM), http://www.theatlantic.comlintemational/archive/
2012/06/americas-english-style-lega-system-evolved-to-conceal-truth-nt-revea-it/258417
(suggesting that more than four percent of the U.S. prison population is innocent and "more than
half of guilty defendants get off").
14. Compare Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 420 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our
society has a high degree of confidence in its criminal trials, in no small part because the
Constitution offers unparalleled protections against convicting the innocent."), with Marsh, 548
U.S. at 198 (Scalia, J., concurring) (agreeing with an estimate of an error rate in criminal
convictions of 0.027%).
2013]
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convictions is mistaken identification.15 There may be no way appellate
review can address that problem. But prosecutorial misconduct, police
misconduct, bad lawyering, and flawed scientific evidence also contrib-
uted significantly to wrongful convictions;' 6 and these problems can
likely be reduced by attentive appellate enforcement of the rules
intended to prevent them. By ensuring compliance with laws designed to
combat these sources of error, appellate courts can play a role in increas-
ing the accuracy of the criminal justice system.
Yet the appellate court has a second role. In addition to identifying
errors, the appellate court must also consider whether a trial court's error
merits reversal.' 7 Even though the appellate court must examine the con-
sequence of the errors in the factual context of each case to decide this
question, the role of the appellate court is not, as the U.S. Supreme
Court has often emphasized, "to determine guilt or innocence."' 8 This
view of the role of the appellate courts as guarantors of fairness and
reliability (rather than guilt or innocence) is not controversial.
In light of the importance of appellate review of criminal convic-
tions, this article questions whether the Supreme Court's plain error doc-
trine, as articulated in United States v. Olano, establishes a workable
"discretionary" framework for allowing appellate courts to remedy
unpreserved errors-those not preserved with a timely objection before
the trial court-that "'seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.' ,'s An examination of this doctrine
shows that it encourages appellate courts to dispose of a defendant's
appeal without a precedent-oriented legal analysis of asserted errors and
their effects on the fairness and reliability of the process that led to the
defendant's conviction and sentence. Rather, it diverts the appellate
court's attention from the correctness of the trial court's rulings and the
seriousness of any deviations from the law on the defendant's trial and
sentencing in favor of reconsidering the guilt or innocence of the defen-
dant. This is a problem because empirical evidence suggests that when
appellate courts focus on the evidence of guilt, they are not particularly
good at detecting and correcting error. In one review of DNA-related
exonerations, ten percent of appellate courts declined to reverse in spite
of error because the evidence was "overwhelming."2 And, because the
15. Factors Leading to Wrongful Convictions, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/understand/factors-74-chart.php (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
16. Id.
17. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
18. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 763 (1946) (citations omitted).
19. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).
20. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 109 (2008).
[Vol. 67:521
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plain error inquiry purports to be discretionary, it also prevents the crea-
tion of precedent that would guide both future defendants and appellate
courts in their analyses of the seriousness of unpreserved errors on the
fairness and reliability of their own judicial proceedings.
For instance, in United States v. Flores-Perez,21 the defendant
argued that the prosecution engaged in misconduct at trial.22 On appeal,
the United States conceded and the Court of Appeals agreed that the trial
court erred in failing to remedy the prosecutorial misconduct, even with-
out the aid of a timely objection from defense counsel. 23 Nevertheless,
without any further explanation, the appellate court concluded that the
weight of the evidence against the defendant was so significant that the
trial court's error had not "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of the judicial proceedings. 24 Thus, the court declined
to exercise its discretion to correct the error. 25 The court cited no prece-
dent stating that prosecutorial misconduct of the kind the defendant
experienced could ever, as a matter of law, "seriously affect[ ] the fair-
ness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. '26 The
court also failed to explain either why the evidence was so overwhelm-
ing that it essentially rendered the conceded error moot, or why the judi-
cial proceeding that convicted defendant was "fair" in spite of the
prosecutor's conceded misconduct.27 In short, the court was so con-
vinced of the defendant's guilt that it was willing to overlook the error.
The majority's account may seem reasonable. No trial is perfect
and courts have long recognized that it is a waste of the valuable time of
judges, juries, and lawyers to retry a case to correct an error that had no
real effect on the jury's decision to convict the defendant. 28 This is par-
ticularly true when, as was the case in Flores-Perez, defense counsel
failed to object to the error at trial.
But the Flores-Perez majority's opinion elicited a dissenting opin-
ion from Judge Andrew Kleinfeld.2 9 In his dissent, Judge Kleinfeld elab-
orated on the alleged prosecutorial misconduct.30 The prosecutor told the
jury that, when they retired to the jury room, they were "no longer obli-
21. 311 F. App'x 69 (9th Cir. 2009).
22. Id. at 70.
23. Id.
24. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
25. Id.
26. Id. (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
27. See id.
28. See, e.g., FED. R. CRim. P. 52(a); Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 759-60
(1946).
29. Flores-Perez, 311 F. App'x at 71 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
20131
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gated to presume innocence."'3 The prosecutor also told the jury that
there was a "lengthy report" about the defendant that, "according to the
rules of evidence, you will not be seeing. 32 In Judge Kleinfeld's view,
the "case ultimately boiled down to a credibility determination-would
the jury believe [the defendant] or the Border Patrol agents. '33 There-
fore, Judge Kleinfeld concluded that the prosecutor's misconduct did
"seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings," and he would have reversed.34
To be clear, this article does not argue that the Flores-Perez court
necessarily reached the wrong result.35 However, this article does con-
tend that both courts and defendants would be better served if the major-
ity had employed a precedent-oriented legal analysis to the facts of the
case, thereby fully articulating the reasoning for its refusal to reverse the
defendant's conviction. The parties would be more readily able to deter-
mine whether the court reached a legally justifiable result (even if not
the desired result) if the majority had fully stated the legal and factual
rationales for its decision. Flores-Perez also illustrates the danger that,
in the absence of applicable precedents, appellate courts can substitute
their view of the guilt of the defendant for a judgment as to whether the
case presented a serious error. Because of these problems, decisions like
the Flores-Perez majority's decision do little to help future courts or
defendants in deciding what kinds and levels of prosecutorial miscon-
duct are sufficiently serious to warrant a remedy.
Given these apparent problems, this article examines the analytical
approach that federal appellate courts employ to review and remedy-or
to refuse to remedy-an error that a criminal defendant failed to pre-
serve with a timely objection at trial. As section II will show, the plain
error doctrine emerged as a safety valve to ensure that appellate courts
could relieve a defendant of an improper conviction or illegal sentence
without being hamstrung on the technicality of the defendant's failure to
object to the error at trial. Because the safety valve operates at the
expense of other values that are critical in the adversary setting, courts
have struggled to ensure that there is a meaningful limit to the reach of
this safety valve to cases where the appellate court is seriously con-
cerned with the possibility that a defendant was unfairly or incorrectly
convicted or a defendant was illegally sentenced. Section II argues that




34. Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Indeed, the decision is a faithful (if brief) example of the kind of analysis that the
Supreme Court's plain error doctrine requires.
[Vol. 67:521
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to be exercised only to remedy serious errors, the competing interests of
judicial economy and fairness to defendants actually align to support a
plain error doctrine that requires courts to develop and apply an analyti-
cal, precedent-oriented approach to serious error. Section II will also
show that even though the analysis of whether an unpreserved error was
sufficiently serious to merit reversal is necessarily a case-specific factual
inquiry, appellate courts can still develop precedent to guide future
courts and defendants in understanding whether an unpreserved error
will merit review and reversal. Section II concludes that such precedents
can foster judicial economy and finality because they foreclose appeals
of many unpreserved errors, and, in the remaining appeals, appellate
courts and defendants will be able to focus their analysis and argument
around the existing precedents.
Section III further discusses how the plain error doctrine, as
described in Olano, fails to snugly connect with the rationales that sup-
port allowing appellate courts to engage in a limited review of criminal
convictions for serious error. It then proposes a reformulation of the
plain error doctrine that would both encourage the development of a
body of caselaw to aid judges and defendants in their efforts to decide
when an unpreserved error merits reversal and focus appellate courts on
the seriousness of trial errors rather than on the innocence or guilt of the
defendant.
Section IV returns to the Flores-Perez case and concludes by show-
ing how the Flores-Perez majority's analysis, regardless of its correct-
ness, demonstrates the need for and value of the rule that this article
proposes.
II. THE APPEAL OF THE UNPRESERVED ERROR
The starting point for an analysis of the federal appellate court's
authority to review a criminal defendant's appeal of an unpreserved
error is the plain error rule: Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). A
straightforward reading of Rule 52 suggests that courts (including dis-
trict courts themselves) can remedy an unpreserved error, even when the
error is not brought to the court's attention, so long as the unpreserved
error affects a party's "substantial rights":
36
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance
that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.
36. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (construing FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b)).
Although the party alleging the error is usually a defendant, the rule also applies to prosecutors'
contentions of error. See, e.g., United States v. Saleh, 257 F. App'x 740, 746 (5th Cir. 2007) (per
curiam) (concluding that the United States had not shown how its substantial rights were affected
by the error in calculating the defendant's sentence).
2013]
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(b) Plain Error. A plain error that affects substantial rights may be
considered even though it was not brought to the court's
attention.37
Even so, in 1993, in United States v. Olano, the Supreme Court
provided the cornerstone contemporary interpretation of Rule 52's plain
error analysis. 38 The Olano Court explained that, to merit reversal, an
unpreserved error must do more than merely affect substantial rights.39
The appellant must demonstrate that the error meets all the criteria of a
four-pronged test.40 There must first be an error.4  Second, this error
must be "clear" or "obvious. 42 Third, the error must also affect the
defendant's substantial rights.43 Fourth, the Olano rule allows the appel-
late court the "discretion" to remedy an error only when it "seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceed-
ings."'  For convenience, this article will refer to an error that "seriously
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed-
ings" as a "serious error."
A. The Authority to Remedy Unpreserved Error
Although Olano provides the seminal modern statement of the
plain error doctrine,4 5 Olano did not purport to announce any new devel-
opment in its understanding of the plain error doctrine generally or Rule
52 in particular.46 On the contrary, the Supreme Court explicitly noted
37. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
38. See generally Olano, 507 U.S. 725.
39. Id. at 732.
40. Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1428-29 (2009) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at
732-34, 736).
41. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-33. Olano notes that a waiver of a waivable right-the
"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right"-is not an error. Id. at 733 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the plain error rule applies to only "forfeiture" or
the "failure to make the timely assertion of a right." Id.
42. Id. at 734 ("At a minimum, a court of appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule
52(b) unless the error is clear under current law."); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152,
163 (1982) ("By its terms, recourse may be had to [Rule 52(b)] only on appeal from a trial
infected with error so 'plain' the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even
absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it."); see also generally Toby J. Heytens,
Managing Transitional Moments in Criminal Cases, 115 YALE L.J. 922 (2006) (discussing how
courts should address a change in the law during the pendency of a defendant's appeal).
43. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35.
44. Id. at 735-36 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) ("Rule 52(b) is permissive,
not mandatory. If the forfeited error is 'plain' and 'affect[s] substantial rights,' the court of appeals
has authority to order correction, but is not required to do so."). However, the Supreme Court also
wrote, "The court of appeals should no doubt correct a plain forfeited error that causes the
conviction or sentencing of an actually innocent defendant .... " Id. at 736.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164 (2010) (citing the Olano test as
the Supreme Court's authoritative statement on the meaning of Rule 52).
46. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-37.
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that "the standard that should guide the exercise of remedial discretion
under Rule 52(b) was articulated in 1936 in United States v. Atkinson."47
Likewise, the advisory committee notes to Rule 52 indicated that the
rule was intended to serve as "a restatement of existing law," and
referred to Wiborg v. United States48 and Hemphill v. United States49 as
examples of the existing law related to the review of unpreserved
error.50 In these three early cases, the Court grappled with both the ques-
tion of whether an appellate court has the authority to review an
unpreserved error and, if so, under what circumstances. They show that
in spite of the Courts' evident awareness of the competing values inher-
ent in the decision to analyze an unpreserved error, justice compels
appellate courts to nevertheless remedy an unpreserved error when it is
"vital" to the defendant's case.51
Wiborg v. United States, decided in 1896, is the earliest of these
three cases. In Wiborg, two of the co-defendants appealed their convic-
tions, and argued there was inadequate proof to affirm their convic-
tions.5" The Supreme Court agreed, briefly acknowledging that the
defendants had never argued the inadequacy of the evidence before the
trial court: "[A]lthough this question was not properly raised, yet if a
plain error was committed in a matter so absolutely vital to defendants,
we feel ourselves at liberty to correct it."53
The federal rules advisory committee also specifically referred to
47. Id. at 736 (citation omitted). Moreover, the Olano Court concluded that the error in the
case had not affected the defendant's substantial rights, and therefore, the Olano Court did not
need to consider whether the error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings" or whether to exercise its purported corrective discretion. Id. at 741. For
that reason, the Olano Court's statements about the corrective discretion of the appellate court are
merely dicta. Jeffrey L. Lowry, Note, Plain Error Rule-Clarifying Plain Error Analysis Under
Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065,
1078 (1994). But even if the statements are not dicta, because the case did not turn on the issue of
the appellate court's corrective discretion, I argue that Olano did not present a genuine
opportunity to examine the soundness of the corrective discretion component of the plain error
analysis in a context where the court's analysis of that component mattered. Therefore, Olano
should not be regarded as a definitive statement on that component of the analysis.
48. 163 U.S. 632 (1896).
49. 112 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 657 (1941) (per
curiam).
50. FED. R. CRtI. P. 52 advisory committee's note. But see Notes to the Rules of Criminal
Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 4 F.R.D. 405, 405 (1944) ("The Notes are
not to be regarded as a part of the Rules. They have been prepared without supervision or revision
by the Supreme Court, and are not approved or sponsored by the Court. They have no official
sanction and are intended merely as suggestions and guides." (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
51. Wiborg, 163 U.S. at 658.
52. See id. at 658-59.
53. Id. at 658.
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Hemphill v. United States, in which the Ninth Circuit expressed a similar
view:
True, we have the right under our rules, should we choose to
exercise it, to notice plain error, unassigned or unnoticed in the trial
court, to prevent a miscarriage of justice in an exceptional case,
where the error is particularly harmful. But that is not the case
here.... [W]e think the harm done by the question was mitigated by
the answer and that no prejudice appears sufficient to warrant a rever-
sal .... 54
But the Supreme Court itself provided the fullest exposition of the
competing values at stake in the decision to review an unpreserved error
in 1936 in United States v. Atkinson:
The verdict of a jury will not ordinarily be set aside for error not
brought to the attention of the trial court. This practice is founded
upon considerations of fairness to the court and to the parties and of
the public interest in bringing litigation to an end after fair opportu-
nity has been afforded to present all issues of law and fact. 5
However, Atkinson went on to conclude: "In exceptional circumstances,
especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may,
of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken,
if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fair-
ness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings."56
Like Wiborg and Hemphill, Atkinson was, first and foremost, about
the question of whether an appellate court has the authority to remedy an
unpreserved error. 7 As Lester Orfield explained, "The general rule gov-
erning appellate procedure is that the court will refuse to consider ques-
tions not raised below."58 This general rule is often referred to as the
contemporaneous-objection rule.59 Indeed, when a defendant fails to
object to an error, one might argue that no "question" was even
54. Hemphill, 112 F.2d at 507. The Hemphill court cited no authority for its statement of the
law. See id.
55. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 159 (1936).
56. Id. at 160.
57. See id. at 159-60.
58. Orfield, supra note 4, at 840; see also United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 709 (11 th
Cir. 1998) ("The narrowness of the plain error rule is a reflection of the importance, indeed
necessity, of the contemporaneous objection rule to which it is an exception."); United States v.
Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1349 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Reversing a conviction on the basis of an error
that the defendant's lawyer failed to bring to the judge's attention is inconsistent with the premises
of an adversary system .... "). The Silverstein court concluded that such a reversal was
"justifiable only when the reviewing court is convinced that it is necessary in order to avert an
actual miscarriage of justice, which implies the conviction of one who but for the error probably
would have been acquitted. [The Court is] not convinced that there was such a miscarriage here."
Silverstein, 732 F.2d at 1349.
59. E.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).
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"presented to the trial court," and therefore, "there is nothing [for the
appellate court] to review. '"60
Even so, the federal courts have uniformly rejected this notion, and
concluded that they have the authority to remedy certain unpreserved
errors in criminal cases.6" They have done so even though, as Atkinson
discussed, many of the pertinent policy considerations militate against
any review of unpreserved errors.62 Indeed, in addition to addressing the
authority of the appellate court to remedy an unpreserved error, Atkinson
outlined these pertinent policy considerations: (1) fairness to the trial
court; (2) fairness to the parties; (3) the public interest in finality of the
judgment; (4) the public interest in ensuring that criminal defendants in
particular receive a fair trial that correctly applies the applicable law.6 3
The first of these considerations, fairness to the trial court, may
seem somewhat out of place. After all, the trial court is supposed to be a
neutral party without an interest in the proceeding 64 and the whole
notion of the appellate court system presupposes the possibility that trial
courts make errors.65 But courts and commentators have often empha-
sized (though not recently) that "[c]onsiderations of fairness to the trial
court compel" a limited review for unpreserved errors "since the trial
court should not be held to have committed an error with regard to a
question it did not rule on and which was not called to its attention.
66
This concern for the trial court may be a legacy of the writ of error
system that predated the criminal appeal as we know it today.67 Under
the writ of error system, a defendant who believed the trial court had
erred could obtain relief through only a new proceeding alleging the
error directly against the trial court judge.68 Of course, under such a
system, it would be "unfair to reverse [the trial judge's] judgment on a
60. Orfield, supra note 4, at 840.
61. See generally Joe Ivy Gillespie, Note, Appellate Review in a Criminal Case of Errors
Made Below Not Properly Raised and Reserved, 23 Miss. L.J. 42 (1951).
62. Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 159.
63. See id.at 159-60.
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2006).
65. See Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE
L.J. 62, 66-67 (1985) (noting that appellate review exists to ensure both that the trial court reaches
the correct result and that the process treats the parties fairly).
66. Gillespie, supra note 61, at 43; see Calvert Magruder, The Trials and Tribulations of an
Intermediate Appellate Court, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 3 (1958) (expressing one appellate judge's
view that "[w]e should never unnecessarily try to make a monkey of the judge in the court below,
or to trespass on his feelings or dignity and self-respect"); Orfield, supra note 4, at 840 ("[I]t
seems inequitable to the trial court to chalk up a reversal against it when it was given no
opportunity to correct its error.").
67. See Rhett R. Dennerline, Note, Pushing Aside the General Rule in Order to Raise New
Issues on Appeal, 64 IND. L.J. 985, 986 (1989).
68. See id.; see also Rossman, supra note 6, at 541-42.
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point which had never been brought to his attention. ' 69 Although we
have long since abandoned the writ of error system, it may be that trial
court judges are sensitive about being reversed by an appellate court
because reversal implies the trial judge failed to do something that he or
she should have done.7° Out of professional courtesy, the appellate court
may still be reluctant to reverse a trial court given the potential that this
reversal could cause embarrassment or other negative consequences for
the trial court judge.7'
Conversely, however, the potential for trial court error is present in
every appeal.72 Because the main role of appellate courts is to determine
whether the lower court erred, and because appellate courts routinely
correct the preserved errors of the lower courts, it is difficult to deter-
mine how this consideration ought to influence an appellate court in
deciding whether to consider an unpreserved error. This may explain
why the Supreme Court's contemporary explanations of the plain error
rule do not explicitly refer to fairness to the trial court as a significant
component of the appellate court's decision to exercise its authority to
review or remedy an unpreserved error.7 3 Moreover, an appellate court
can still exercise due professional courtesy to lower court judges in the
way that the court explains the error in its opinion.74
While the consideration of fairness to the trial court has dwindled
69. Dennerline, supra note 67, at 986.
70. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Indeed, it may be that the "clear or obvious"
prong of Olano's plain error formulation implies that the error is one the trial court should have
prevented, even without the aid of an objection from defendant or defendant's counsel. See United
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982) ("By its terms, recourse may be had to [Rule 52(b)]
only on appeal from a trial infected with error so 'plain' the trial judge and prosecutor were
derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in detecting it.").
71. See William G. Ross, Civility Among Judges: Charting the Bounds of Proper Criticism by
Judges of Other Judges, 51 FLA. L. REV. 957, 962 (1999) ("The reversal of a lower court decision
is a conclusive rebuke to a lower court .... "); see also Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin,
Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 134 (1980) (postulating that a judge's reversal rate is a
proxy for the quality of the judge's decisions); David E. Klein & Robert J. Hume, Fear of
Reversal as an Explanation of Lower Court Compliance, 37 LAW & Soc'v REV. 579, 582 (2003)
(theorizing that trial court judges fear reversals because they might engender disrespect for the
judge's legal abilities, reduce opportunities for advancement, harm the judge's reputation, and
"impede[ I judges' efforts to shape policy").
72. See supra notes 3-8, 65 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2164-67 (2010); United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-37 (1993).
74. See Ross, supra note 71, at 958-62 (suggesting that judges retain a tone of "professional
courtesy and respect among judges" and implying that the tone of the appellate court's reversal is
important in maintaining the "institutional legitimacy of the courts"). But see Higgins & Rubin,
supra note 71, at 134 (proposing reversal rate as a measure of quality for a judge's decisions).
Obviously, a judge's reversal rate could not, by itself, convey the appellate court's understanding
that an unpreserved error was never brought to the trial court's attention, and that the error was,
therefore, more easily missed. Nevertheless, to the extent that the consideration for the effect of a
review of unpreserved error on the trial court is of concern to the appellate court, perhaps scholars
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in importance in contemporary cases involving unpreserved errors, the
remaining considerations that Atkinson identified-fairness to the par-
ties, the public interest in finality of the judgment, and the public interest
in ensuring that criminal defendants in particular receive a fair trial-
remain vital.
Although Atkinson referred to "fairness to the .. .parties" as a
unitary concept, 5 it can be conceptualized as referring simultaneously to
two distinct but closely related concepts. First, it refers to the basic fair-
ness inherent in giving both sides an equal and contemporaneous oppor-
tunity to make their case.76 Either party can tender objections to the
presentation of evidence, argument, selection of jurors, or sentencing.
The party responding to the objection can concede or respond to the
objection with argument and even with evidence when appropriate.77
Then, the trial court can rule on the issue, and both sides can continue
trying the case with the uncertainty of the objection resolved.78 In some
cases, the trial court can "correct or avoid the mistake so that it cannot
possibly affect the ultimate outcome."7 9 In other cases, a party respond-
ing to an objection might concede the point either because it agrees with
the objection or simply concludes concession is more expedient than
contest.80 Regardless, when objections are made at the trial court, the
responding party can easily concede issues without compromising the
possibility of obtaining a favorable judgment. On appeal, by contrast,
the appellee has little choice but to defend the judgment against the
appellant's contentions of error.
The second aspect of fairness to the parties is to discourage
"sandbagging."' 8' This term refers to a party's intentional effort to
"game" the system by making one argument at trial, and, if that does not
prevail, trying a new strategy on appeal.82 Or, even more egregiously, a
and judicial administrators ought to distinguish between reversals based on unpreserved errors
from other errors.
75. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 159 (1936).
76. See Robert J. Martineau, Considering New Issues on Appeal: The General Rule and the
Gorilla Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1023, 1029 (1987).
77. See id.
78. See id. at 1029-30; see also Gillespie, supra note 61, at 43.
79. Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1428 (2009); see also Martineau, supra note 76,
at 1029 (noting that the objection requirement allows "'the adversary the opportunity either to
avoid the challenged action or to present a reasoned defense of the trial court's action; and it
provides the trial court with the alternative of altering or modifying a decision or of ordering a
more fully developed record for review"' (quoting Pfeifer v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 678
F.2d 453, 457 n.l (3d Cir. 1982), vacated on other grounds, 462 U.S. 523 (1983))).
80. See Martineau, supra note 76, at 1029-30 (observing that the responding party may agree
with the objecting party).
81. See Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1428.
82. See id.; Thomas M. Hoskinson, Note, Criminal Procedure: Trial Integrity and the
Defendant's Rights Under the Plain Error Rule 52(b), 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1129, 1132 (2004).
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party might strategically choose not to object to a known error so that, in
the case of an adverse judgment, the error will lead the trial court or the
appellate court to order a new trial.83 Either way, a sandbagging party
attempts to use the appellate process as a lever to obtain an unfair advan-
tage over the opposing party. Appellate courts suspecting this strategy
have uniformly disapproved of it as an unjustifiable effort to get a "sec-
ond bite at the apple."84
The third of the four policy values that Atkinson identified was the
public interest in the finality of the judgment.8 5 The Supreme Court
elaborated on this value in the habeas corpus context in Wainwright v.
Sykes.86 It noted that strict enforcement of the contemporaneous-objec-
tion rule had a salutary effect on both the quality and efficiency of the
criminal trial.87 At the trial,
[a] defendant has been accused of a serious crime, and this is the time
and place set for him to be tried by a jury of his peers and found
either guilty or not guilty by that jury. To the greatest extent possible
all issues which bear on this charge should be determined in this pro-
ceeding: the accused is in the court-room, the jury is in the box, the
judge is on the bench, and the witnesses, having been subpoenaed
and duly swom, await their turn to testify. Society's resources have
been concentrated at that time and place in order to decide, within the
limits of human fallibility, the question of guilt or innocence of one
of its citizens. Any procedural rule which encourages the result that
those proceedings be as free of error as possible is thoroughly desira-
ble, and the contemporaneous-objection rule surely falls within this
classification.88
And, as Sykes alludes, the contemporaneous-objection rule also
generally limits appeals to the issues timely presented to the trial court,
thereby promoting judicial economy.89 As appellate courts periodically
note, no trial is perfect, but a fair trial need not be perfect.90 Since no
trial is perfect, we must have finality at some point.
83. United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 709 (11 th Cir. 1998) (defining "sandbagging" as
"saving an issue for appeal in hopes of having another shot at trial if the first one misses");
Hoskinson, supra note 82, at 1132.
84. E.g., United States v. Jenkins, 347 F. App'x 793, 798 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United
States v. Valencia-Lucena, 925 F.2d 506, 514 (1st Cir. 1991)); United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283,
287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
85. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 159 (1936).
86. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-90 (1977).
87. Id. at 90.
88. Id.
89. See Dennerline, supra note 67, at 992 ("[T]he rule sharply limits the number of appeals,
expressing a sincere concern for judicial economy.").
90. E.g., United States v. Shoup, 476 F.3d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing United States v.
Ortiz, 447 F.3d 28, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2006)); United States v. Gabaldon, 91 F.3d 91, 95 (10th Cir.
1996) (quoting United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 247 (10th Cir. 1987)).
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All of the first three policy considerations that Atkinson described
militate against appellate court review of unpreserved error and in favor
of a strict application of the contemporaneous-objection rule. Only the
final policy consideration that Atkinson identified-the public interest in
ensuring that the criminal defendant receives a fair trial9 '-weighs in
favor of the review of unpreserved error.
Although Atkinson, as a civil case, did not provide the Supreme
Court an opportunity to elaborate on this weighty consideration, 92 the
Supreme Court has done so in other criminal cases. For instance, in Cly-
att v. United States, the Supreme Court explained:
[I]t is the imperative duty of a court to see that all the elements of [a
defendant's] crime are proved .... Only in the exact administration
of the law will justice in the long run be done, and the confidence of
the public in such administration be maintained.
93
Indeed, in many of the early cases that discussed the appellate
courts' authority to review unpreserved errors, the appellate courts were
satisfied that the evidence produced at trial was simply insufficient to
prove the defendants' guilt under the correct view of the applicable law,
and therefore the courts reversed the convictions.94
The importance of correctly stating and applying the law is espe-
cially high in the criminal context because errors can lead to wrongful
convictions, and the wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant is
abhorrent to our judicial system. The Supreme Court has stated that this
"concern is reflected.. . in the 'fundamental value determination of our
society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty
man go free.'"'95 The federal courts have also acknowledged that the
weight this policy consideration must receive in the criminal adjudica-
tion process is heavy: "'The maxim of the law is ... that it is better that
ninety-nine ...offenders should escape, than that one innocent man
should be condemned.' ,
96
Moreover, as Atkinson articulated the policy concern, it is not only
the defendant's significant interest in a fair trial and an accurate convic-
91. See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 159-60 (1936).
92. See id. at 160.
93. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 222 (1905).
94. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 107, 113 (1945) (plurality opinion); Clyatt, 197
U.S. at 222; Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 659-60 (1896).
95. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 893 (3d Cir. 1994)
("Our system of criminal justice prides itself on the ability to assure that no innocent person is
convicted wrongfully .... ").
96. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 325 (alterations in original) (quoting THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, AND DIGEST OF PROOFS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS 756 (1824)).
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tion that mitigates toward a limited appellate review of unpreserved
errors. On the contrary, the policy also reflects "the public interest.
97
And, in this sense, the policy reflects a concern for both "present and
future litigants who look to the courts to resolve disputes."98 Accord-
ingly, this policy supports not only the notion that an appellate court
ought, in an appropriate case, to review an unpreserved error, but that it
also should announce legal rules to ensure that similarly situated future
defendants can likewise obtain review.99
Aktinson and Wiborg unequivocally established that the duty of the
appellate courts required that they "temper[ ]"1oo the harshness of the
contemporaneous-objection rule with a willingness to review serious
unpreserved errors. 101 To do otherwise would undermine the credibility
of the conviction or sentence and the judicial process itself. The drafters
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure codified this authority to
remedy unpreserved errors in Rule 52(b).
1°2
B. The Discretion to Remedy Unpreserved Error
While Rule 52 may have clarified that the federal appellate courts
have the authority to remedy an unpreserved error, neither the text of
Rule 52 nor the cases that preceded it fully clarified when the appellate
court ought to exercise this authority."0 3 Were the appellate courts to
exercise this authority too loosely, it would compromise the values that
supported the contemporaneous-objection rule in the first place, thereby
exacting a serious cost in terms of fairness, judicial economy, and public
perception. 104 Conversely, however, if appellate courts wielded this
authority too sparingly, they might affirm the convictions of innocent
defendants or ratify illegal sentences. 10 5 Thus, as the Supreme Court has
acknowledged: "Any unwarranted extension of [the] exacting definition
of plain error would skew the Rule's 'careful balancing of our need to
encourage all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first
time around against our insistence that obvious injustice be promptly
97. See Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160.
98. Martineau, supra note 76, at 1031.
99. See id. 1033-34.
100. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985).
101. See id. at 15 & n.12 (citing Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160; Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S.
632 (1896)).
102. FED. R. CrM. P. 52 advisory committee's note.
103. See Heytens, supra note 42, at 955-56 (noting that the Supreme Court has "provide[d]
little assistance in determining what factors courts should consider when deciding whether to
correct a harmful but forfeited error").
104. See supra Section lI.A.
105. See supra Section II.A.
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redressed.' ,10 6 Granting relief under Rule 52(b) too liberally would give
defendants "'extravagant protection.' -
10 7
The Supreme Court further clarified the circumstances under which
an appellate court should review and remedy an unpreserved error in
United States v. Olano.10 8 First, the authority extends to only errors
involving a failure to make a "timely assertion of a right."' 1 9 Thus, when
the defendant "intentionally relinquish[es] or abandon[s] ... a known
right," and the defendant has followed any necessary procedure for
doing so, the appellate court cannot exercise its authority to relieve the
defendant of the consequences of the choice. a 0 Second, the error must
have been "clear" or "obvious" under the law as it stands at the time of
the appeal.111 Third, the defendant must show that the asserted error
affected his or her "substantial rights," which generally means that the
error prejudiced the defendant.112
Even if an error meets all of these criteria, however, the appellate
court's authority to remedy an unpreserved error under Rule 52(b) "is
permissive, not mandatory." '1 13 But the boundaries of the discretion that
the appellate court possesses to remedy unpreserved errors are not par-
ticularly clear.114
106. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S.
152, 163 (1982)); see also Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009) (citation
omitted) (using the same language).
107. Young, 470 U.S. at 16 (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 n.12 (1977)).
108. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993).
109. Id. at 733.
110. Id.; see also Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1429.
111. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; see also generally Heytens, supra note 42, at 953-73
(considering the consequences of a defendant's failure to object at trial on the appellate court's
authority to give the defendant the benefit of a change in the law during the pendency of the direct
appeal). However, in United States v. Atkinson, the Supreme Court said that an appellate court
could remedy an unpreserved error if the error was obvious or if it had "seriously affect[ed] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936). The
Olano formulation requires that the error be both obvious and serious. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.
112. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. Although Rule 52(a) already indicates that a court shall disregard
any error "that does not affect substantial rights," and contains no express indication that this rule
does not apply to cases involving unpreserved error, FED. R. CRim. P. 52(a), the Olano Court
concluded that Rule 52(a)'s "substantial rights" inquiry applied only to preserved errors. See
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734. For unpreserved errors, Olano announced the same inquiry was required,
but emanated from Rule 52(b), and, under this inquiry, the defendant bore the "burden of
persuasion with respect to prejudice." Id. Moreover, Olano also considered that there might be
some errors that might not require a showing of prejudice, and yet other cases in which the court
might presume prejudice, but the facts of Olano did not require the court to elaborate on those
possibilities. Id. at 735.
113. Id.
114. Heytens, supra note 42, at 955-56; see also United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159,
2169 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 15
(1970) ("There is obvious need of guidelines to control appellate discretion in the evaluation of
error." (footnote omitted)).
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The Olano Court stated that "the standard that should guide the
exercise of remedial discretion under Rule 52(b) was articulated in
United States v. Atkinson."'1 5 Under the Atkinson standard, the "court of
appeals should correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights
if the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.' "116
But it is not clear what this standard requires. In adopting this stan-
dard, the Olano Court acknowledged that, in one line of precedent, the
Court had explained that the remedial discretion "should be employed
'in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would other-
wise result,' '17 and that the term "miscarriage of justice," at least in the
closely related context of the Supreme Court's collateral review juris-
prudence, "means that the defendant is actually innocent."" 8 Olano con-
cluded this definition was too narrow: "The court of appeals should no
doubt correct a plain forfeited error that causes the conviction or sen-
tencing of an actually innocent defendant, but we have never held that a
Rule 52(b) remedy is only warranted in cases of actual innocence."11 9
The Olano Court concluded, however, that it did not need to address the
question of whether the asserted error was serious because the error did
not affect the defendant's substantial rights.
1 20
Since Olano, the Supreme Court has not meaningfully clarified the
standards that ought to guide appellate courts in their decision to remedy
unpreserved errors. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the exis-
tence of serious error must not be judged using a "'per se approach"'
but rather "on a case-specific and fact-intensive basis." 121 Every case,
the Supreme Court notes, "'necessarily turns on its own facts.'1 2 2 Thus,
while an appellate court must review the facts of the case to satisfy itself
that there has been a serious error before it may provide a remedy, the
115. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736.
116. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160).
117. Id. (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
118. Id. (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1992)).
119. Id. (first emphasis added) (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 741.
121. Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1433 (2009) (citation omitted). Thus, the
Puckett Court endorsed the notion that the government's breach of a plea agreement must always
satisfy every component of the Olano plain error analysis. Id. at 1431-33. Although the Puckett
Court agreed that "when the Government reneges on a plea deal, the integrity of the system may
be called into question," it stated that nevertheless "there may well be countervailing factors in
particular cases." Id. at 1433. See also United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2163-64 (2010)
(rejecting a Second Circuit rule that "'a retrial is necessary whenever there is any possibility, no
matter how unlikely, that the jury could have convicted based exclusively on pre-enactment
conduct"' (citation omitted)).




Supreme Court has said little about how the appellate court should deter-
mine whether a trial error, which is, by definition, a deviation from the
procedural rules designed to ensure a fair trial, is sufficiently serious to
warrant a remedy.
The only other guidance that the Supreme Court has provided about
serious error comes as an inference from its repeated insistence that
plain errors are rare. 23 It is "difficult," we are told, to demonstrate "all
four prongs [of the Olano plain error test] . . . 'as it should be.'
124
Perhaps it should. But even in sum, this guidance to the appellate
courts leaves open how the appellate courts should separate the deserv-
ing case from the meritless one. Appellate courts know they must
examine the consequence of the error on the trial process, 125 and, from
this examination, somehow determine which errors are serious enough
to merit a remedy.
126
C. Vindicating the Contemporaneous- Objection Rule
One might reasonably wonder if this critique of the open nature of
the appellate court's discretion to remedy unpreserved errors underval-
ues the appellate court's discretion as a mechanism for restricting the
reach of this exceptional mode of relief to the most egregious errors. The
Supreme Court lauds the "case-specific and fact-intensive" approach as
the ideal method for ensuring that appellate courts can indeed remedy
unpreserved errors without making categorical rules that undercut the
contemporaneous-objection rule and the sound rationales supporting
it.127 Indeed, the Supreme Court's repeated use of the word "discre-
tion" 12 8 to refer to the appellate court's authority to review unpreserved
errors illustrates its concern for preserving the vitality of the contempo-
raneous-objection rule and avoiding a torrent of appeals for unpreserved
123. See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999) ("'It is the rare case in which an
improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been
made in the trial court."' (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977))); see also id. at
389 ("[W]e exercise our power under Rule 52(b) sparingly."); United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S.
25, 35 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the plain error
doctrine "is to be invoked only rarely").
124. Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1429 (citation omitted).
125. See Robinson, 485 U.S. at 35 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that "any application of the plain-error doctrine necessarily includes some form of
prejudice inquiry").
126. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993).
127. Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1433; see also United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2163-64,
2166-67 (2010) (condemning as too broad a Second Circuit rule that required a reversal of a
defendant's conviction when the jury could have based it on conduct occurring before the
enactment of the pertinent criminal statute "'no matter how unlikely"' it was that the jury actually
did so (citation omitted)).
128. E.g., Olano, 507 U.S. at 737.
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error. The notion of discretion implies there is not a single "correct"
answer as to the propriety of remedying unpreserved errors in any par-
ticular case.' 29 Accordingly, no case sets a precedent that future defend-
ants can rely on to "demand" a remedy for similar unpreserved errors.
130
While this discretionary system may appear to give appellate courts
a high level of control over the rate of unpreserved error reversals,
thereby preventing the erosion of the contemporaneous-objection rule, it
provides little guidance to future courts or defendants as to which
unpreserved errors merit consideration or reversal.1 31 Instead, the discre-
tionary system strongly suggests that any unpreserved error can become
a basis for reversal if a defendant's appellate counsel can persuade the
court that the error was sufficiently egregious. 132 Thus, it encourages
defendants' appellate lawyers to scour the record for every colorable
unpreserved error. 133 Indeed, in the absence of rules that foreclose such
relief, the attorney's ordinary duty of diligence may require him or her
to present these arguments to the appellate court as a matter of course.'
34
But the discretionary system, with its implicit concern that well-
defined rules and exceptions might somehow compel future appellate
courts to reverse convictions, even in the face of low-merit assertions of
unpreserved error,135 fails to appreciate that a system of well-defined
rules and exceptions can also foreclose the prospect of appellate review
of an unpreserved error. 136 Legal rules can apprise defendants' appellate
129. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 636-37, 641 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("To say that a
court has discretion in a given area of law is to say that it is not bound to decide the question one
way rather than another .... [T]he term suggests that there is no wrong answer to the questions
posed .... ").
130. See id.
131. See Martineau, supra note 76, at 1056-59 (noting that rules and exceptions allow
"litigants, attorneys, and judges [to] share the same expectations regarding considerations of new
issues on appeal").
132. See id. at 1024 (noting that, because "it is almost impossible to predict ... whether. . . the
appellate court will consider a new issue," the system of discretionary justice encourages appeals);
see also id. at 1034 (reasoning that, without the predictability cultivated by a system of well-
defined rules, "the appellate process becomes little more than an exercise by which the appellant
attempts to persuade the appellate court that the result reached by the trial court was not the 'right'
result").
133. See, e.g., Staples Hughes, Thirty-Four Brief Points About Appellate Advocacy in Criminal
Cases, N.C. CT. SYs. OFF. INDIGENT DEF. SERVICES, http://www.ncids.org/Defender%20Training/
Nuts%20and%2OBolts%20of%20Appellate%20Procedure/34%20brief%20points.pdf (last visited
Jan. 22, 2013) (advising appellate attorneys to present all errors to the appellate court that "hurt at
trial ... even if [it] may not have been obviously preserved at trial for appellate review").
134. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2012).
135. See United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2166-67 (2010) (rejecting a Second Circuit
rule that categorically required reversal of convictions that contained a certain kind of unpreserved
error).
136. See Martineau, supra note 76, at 1057 (concluding that a well-defined system of rules and
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lawyers of when appeals based on unpreserved error can expect little
chance of success.13 7 Therefore, to the extent that controlling the quan-
tity of unpreserved errors that receive appellate review helps to ensure
the continued validity of the contemporaneous-objection rule, there is no
reason to conclude that Olano's discretionary system does a better job of
limiting review than would a system of well-defined rules and
exceptions.
The discretionary approach to reviewing unpreserved errors also
creates a situation in which appellate courts may fail to recognize truly
meritorious plain error appeals because of the relatively high quantity of
low-merit appeals of unpreserved errors that the appellate courts rou-
tinely examine. According to one survey, federal appellate courts
reverse the trial court's judgment only 5.4% of the time in criminal
cases. 138 Although there is a dearth of data on the prevalence of success-
ful appeals premised on arguments of unpreserved error, because
Olano's plain error review is considered quite deferential 39 it is likely
that only a small fraction of this 5.4% reversal rate is attributable to
reversals based on successful arguments of unpreserved error.1 40 Given
that appellate arguments premised on unpreserved error are likely to be
common, but that the chance of success on these arguments is quite low,
appellate courts will likely develop a cognitive bias in favor of rejecting
appeals premised on unpreserved error. 141
This bias is worsened by the Supreme Court's preference for case-
by-case decision-making.142 In the absence of legal precedents that
exceptions allows attorneys and their clients to expect and anticipate when assertions of
unpreserved error will not succeed on appeal).
137. See id.
138. MICHAEL E. TIGAR & JANE B. TIGAR, FEDERAL APPEALS: JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE
§ 5.01 (3d ed. 1999); see also Joy A. Chapper & Roger A. Hanson, In Criminal Appeals:
Identifying Reversible Error, JUDGES' J., Winter 1991, at 3, 4 (1991) (reporting 267 errors in
1,750 criminal cases in the state appellate courts under study).
139. See Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into
the "Affirmance Effect" on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 372
(2005) (noting that plain error review is "highly deferential").
140. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENY. U. L. REv. 665, 670 & fig.2
(2006) (showing that, in the context of the review of cases on direct appeal in the Tenth Circuit
when the Booker decision was announced, those cases that were reviewed under the plain error
standard were reversed far less frequently than cases reviewed under the harmless error standards
applicable to errors preserved with a contemporaneous objection).
141. See Guthrie & George, supra note 139, at 373 ("Thus the strategic theory predicts that
low reversal rates become self-reinforcing: Current judges are hesitant to reverse because prior
judges did not reverse, and so on."); see also JOHN D. MULLEN & BYRON M. ROTH, DECISION-
MAKING: ITS LOGIC AND PRACTICE 95 (1991) (noting that, according to the "availability fallacy,"
decision-makers assume that "the occurrence that comes most easily to mind is the most
probable").
142. See Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1433 (2009).
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direct the attention of courts (and defendants' appellate lawyers) to the
pertinent considerations and give guidance on how to evaluate and bal-
ance them, this bias can go unchecked. Indeed, appellate courts' analy-
ses of defendants' arguments of unpreserved error are often brief and
conclusory, 143 which raises the risk of appellate error.
Appellate courts know that the process of applying existing law to
facts in writing improves the quality of judicial decision-making. In fact,
appellate courts have often insisted that administrative law judges
(ALJs) explain their reasoning in reaching their decisions both because
the process of explanation "'help[s] the ALJ get it right' and it 'allow[s]
[the appellate court] to discharge [its] duty to review the decision.' ",1
Similarly, an appropriate legal analytical framework can help appellate
judges themselves "get it right" in evaluating the seriousness of
unpreserved errors. And, equally important, because defendants' appel-
late lawyers would be using the same analytical framework, they too
would be more able to judge the merits of appealing unpreserved errors
in the first place.
Even though the contemporaneous-objection rule makes ample
sense in our adversarial system of justice, the fairest and most reliable
way to vindicate it in the context of appeals of criminal convictions is
through the application of legal rules that thoughtfully lay out circum-
stances warranting relief from it on appeal.
III. AN ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SERIOUS ERROR
In our attempt to clarify Rule 52(b), we have, I fear, both mud-
died the waters and lost sight of the wisdom embodied in the Rule's
spare text. Errors come in an endless variety of "shapes and sizes."
Because error-free trials are so rare, appellate courts must repeatedly
confront the question of whether a trial judge's mistake was harmless
or warrants reversal. They become familiar with particular judges and
with the vast panoply of trial procedures, they acquire special exper-
tise in dealing with recurring issues, and their doctrine evolves over
time to help clarify and classify various types of mistakes. These are
just a few of the reasons why federal appellate courts are "allowed a
wide measure of discretion in the supervision of litigation in their
respective circuits.
143. See, e.g., United States v. Newmark, 374 F. App'x 279, 283 (3d Cir. 2010); United States
v. Hill, 334 F. App'x 640, 645-46 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Prather, 312 F.
App'x 705, 705-06 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); United States v. Flores-Perez, 311 F. App'x 69,
69-71 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 615-16 (6th Cir. 2008).
144. Gunderson v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 601 F.3d 1013, 1028 (10th Cir. 2010) (O'Brien, J.,
dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Lane Hollow Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers'
Comp. Programs, U.S. Dep't of Labor, 137 F.3d 799, 803 (4th Cir. 1998)).
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United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2169 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted). Because the Olano formulation of the
plain error doctrine did not attempt to engage the appellate courts in the
creation of a body of law that would allow them to evaluate the serious-
ness of errors in context, appellate courts must rely on other, more gen-
eral indicators of seriousness. Unfortunately, as this section describes,
these other indicators of seriousness only guide appellate courts away
from their core purpose of ensuring defendants a fair trial and a sentence
in accord with the law.
A. The Olano Formulation
Olano and the cases that followed have laudably aimed to clarify
for the appellate courts the standards they should follow in determining
whether to remedy an unpreserved error. 4 ' As a practical matter, how-
ever, the Olano formulation does not focus on the essence of the prob-
lem.'4 6 Rather, its four-pronged inquiry needlessly complicates the
analysis, and makes it more difficult for appellate courts to make the
critical assessment: Did the defendant get a fair and reliable trial and a
legal sentence? The Olano formulation distracts both appellate courts
and defendants from this key inquiry because (1) it compels appellate
courts to separately analyze both whether the asserted error affected a
defendant's "substantial rights" and whether it "seriously affect[ed] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings"' 47 even
though both questions are qualitatively similar inquiries into the conse-
quences of the error on the trial; (2) it gives undue weight to the obvi-
ousness of the error; and (3) it focuses the appellate court primarily on
the merits of individual cases rather than on synthesizing and articulat-
ing rules that explain why an error was (or was not) serious. As a result,
the Olano formulation fails to snugly connect with the policy considera-
tions justifying plain error review.
First, Olano introduces a redundancy into the plain error analy-
sis.14 8 The third prong of Olano requires the appellate court to determine
whether the asserted error affected the defendant's "substantial rights,"
as is required under the text of Rule 52(b). 4 9 As Olano explains, an
145. See id. at 2168-69.
146. See id. at 2169.
147. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 736 (1993) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
148. See Michael H. Graham, Abuse of Discretion, Reversible Error, Harmless Error, Plain
Error, Structural Error; A New Paradigm for Criminal Cases, 43 No. 6 CRIM. L. BULL. ART 6
(2007) ("In short, prong three and prong four are, in spite of the protestations in Olano to the
contrary, in practice coterminous.").
149. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.
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error ordinarily affects a defendant's substantial rights when the error
was "prejudicial"; this means "[i]t must have affected the outcome of the
district court proceedings." 1 5° Accordingly, Olano's third prong requires
the court to consider the consequence of the error on the defendant's
conviction and sentence. 51 But that is also a part of the function of
Olano's fourth prong. Under the fourth prong-the serious error
prong-the appellate court must also separately evaluate the conse-
quence of the error under the Atkinson serious-error standard, that is,
whether the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public rep-
utation of judicial proceedings."' 152 However, the fourth prong imposes a
higher standard of seriousness than the third prong: The Olano Court
explicitly acknowledged that an error that affects the defendant's sub-
stantial rights "does not, without more, satisfy the Atkinson standard."' 53
Thus, the third and fourth prongs of the Olano inquiry both require the
same kind of judgment-an evaluation of whether the error had suffi-
ciently serious consequences to merit reversal-but the fourth prong
merely requires a higher level of seriousness. Therefore, the third and
fourth prongs of the formulation could and should be collapsed into a
single inquiry.
Second, Olano's second prong, which requires the appellate court
to determine whether an error is "clear" or "obvious," 154 elevates a perti-
nent consideration into a decisive consideration. Since the purpose of the
plain error doctrine is to determine whether the proceedings in the trial
court were so unfair as to relieve the defendant of the harsh effect of the
contemporaneous-objection rule, the central focus of the inquiry must be
the fairness and reliability of the trial and sentencing. 155 To be sure,
when the trial court makes an obvious error, it is more likely to have
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of proceed-
ings before the trial court. But even when the trial court makes a subtle
150. Id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 736 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id. at 737.
154. Id. at 734.
155. See supra Section II.A. Former Chief Justice of California Roger Traynor also rejected
the "Not Clearly Wrong Result" method of assessing errors:
However egregious the errors, and however great the likelihood that absent the error
a different judgment would have been entered, the court would have to discount the
error as harmless. Such a test operates to diminish judicial responsibility. The
emphasis should not be on whether the judgment is not clearly wrong; how could an
appellate court rest easy in the face of doubt? The emphasis should be on whether
the judgment is not clearly right, so long as there is a substantial chance that error
brought it about.... [lit is perilous to assume that a judgment not clearly wrong, but
still dubious, can be equated with justice.
TRAYNOR, supra note 114, at 17-18.
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error, that error could significantly impair the fairness of the trial if the
consequence of the error was profound, such as the exclusion of critical
defense evidence, the empanelling of a biased juror, or a misstatement of
the applicable law in the jury's instructions. For instance, one can cer-
tainly imagine trial courts making subtle errors in their application of
sophisticated evidentiary rules like the hearsay rule or the expert witness
rule that, despite the errors' subtlety, have a significant effect on the
weight of the evidence presented to the jury. And, as the Olano Court
recognized, the obviousness requirement is even more difficult to apply
when the law applicable to the error changes between the time of the
error and the time of appellate consideration.
1 56
The Supreme Court recognized this in Atkinson. Atkinson's original
requirement for remedying an unpreserved error required that the error
either be obvious or "otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or
public reputation of judicial proceedings." 157 Interpreted another way,
the Atkinson formulation presumed that obvious errors were serious
enough to merit reversal, but acknowledged that other, more subtle
errors could also be serious enough to warrant reversal. 5 8 Olano pur-
ported to accept the Atkinson formulation,159 but misstated it. 160 One
might discount the misstatement as inadvertent and unintentional, except
for the frequency with which the Supreme Court repeats it.1
61
In any case, the obviousness of an error can be very difficult to
assess. 162 While there may be some errors on either end of a spectrum of
156. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 ("We need not consider the special case where the error was
unclear at the time of trial but becomes clear on appeal because the applicable law has been
clarified."); cf Heytens, supra note 42, at 941-42 (arguing that the rationales behind the plain
error analysis do not support a court's refusal to give the defendant the benefit of a law that
changes while the defendant's case awaits a decision on direct review).
157. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).
158. See id. Of course, one might also fairly criticize the Atkinson rule as too broad because
not every obvious error undermines the fairness of the trial and sentencing. But if, as this section
suggests, obviousness is treated merely as a factor in a seriousness inquiry, the court's conclusion
about the obviousness of the error can be tempered by the court's assessment of the other pertinent
factors. See infra Section III.B.
159. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 ("[T]he standard that should guide the exercise of remedial
discretion under Rule 52(b) was articulated in United States v. Atkinson." (citation omitted)).
160. Compare id. ("The court of appeals should correct a plain forfeited error affecting
substantial rights if the error 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings."' (alteration in original) (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160)), with Atkinson,
297 U.S. at 160 ("In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in
the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken,
if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings." (emphasis added)).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631-32 (2002).
162. But see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 363 (5th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that, to merit reversal, "the error must be 'so clear or obvious that the trial judge and
prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendant's timely assistance in
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obviousness, in many cases, the obviousness of the error may be diffi-
cult to discern because it requires the application of a legal rule that is
facially clear but unclear when applied to the facts of the defendant's
case.163 This kind of judgment is quite different from the kind of judg-
ment the appellate court must exercise to determine whether the error
"seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation"" 6 of the
trial court's proceedings 65 because it calls not for an evaluation of the
consequences of the error but, rather, the clarity of the result when the
applicable legal rule is applied to the facts of the defendant's case.
166
Thus, although the blatant obviousness of an error may be a decisive
consideration in a few cases, consideration of the obviousness of the
error will more frequently lead the appellate court away from the key
analysis of the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial court
proceedings.
Finally, the Olano interpretation of the plain error rule invites
appellate courts to do exactly what they are never supposed to do. It
requires the courts to weigh the evidence supporting the defendant's
conviction to determine whether the error undermines the evidence and
arguments that the prosecution produced to prove the defendant's
guilt. 167 Or, phrased differently, the appellate court must speculate as to
whether the prosecution's evidence and arguments were so persuasive as
to the defendant's guilt that the error did not undermine the fairness of
the trial. 168 As Judge Harry Edwards has observed, this focus on the
facts of the case (which occurs in the review of both preserved and
unpreserved errors) is both troubling and unavoidable. 69  Judge
detecting it.'" (quoting United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 319 (5th Cir. 2010))). While such a
rule may help resolve the problem of subjectivity in the assessment of whether an error is "clear"
or "obvious," in doing so it bypasses the central question of the consequence of the error on the
trial process for any error that is not abundantly obvious. See id. Furthermore, it also raises a new
question about the kind of competence that a trial judge apd prosecutor must have in detecting
errors. See id. Of course, this kind of consideration most directly vindicates the "respect for the
trial court judge" rationale discussed in Section II. But, given the diminishing importance of that
rationale in contemporary plain error jurisprudence, placing this much emphasis on the clarity of
the error to the trial court gives it undue weight.
163. See Heytens, supra note 42, at 966.
164. Olano, 507 U.S. at 736 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
165. See United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that each of the four prongs of the Olano analysis require "a distinct form of judgment").
166. See TRAYNOR, supra note 114, at 18-22 (rejecting the "Correct Result" formulation of
harmless error and equating it with the appellate court assuming the role of "a second jury to
determine whether the defendant is guilty").
167. See Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal
Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1189-90 (1995) (explaining that the "miscarriage
of justice" standard takes a "guilt-based approach" to determining the effect of the error).
168. See id.
169. Id. at 1187.
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Edwards, writing about whether an error is "substantial," explained,
Even a brief survey . . . reveals the tendency of judges to apply
the doctrine by assessing whether the evidence adduced at trial, or the-
untainted evidence in the case of an evidentiary error, appears suffi-
cient to support a guilty verdict. In some cases this is as it should be,
for the presence of massive evidence of a defendant's guilt surely is
one factor for a court to consider in ascertaining whether it can say
with fair assurance that an error substantially affected the jury's ver-
dict (or, in the case of constitutional error, whether the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Frequently, however, the
weight of the evidence against a defendant is not just one factor play-
ing into the harmless-error analysis, but rather the sole criterion by
which harmlessness is gauged.
170
Although Judge Edwards was writing about whether a preserved error
affected a defendant's substantial rights, he also observed that the same
phenomenon occurs in the assessment of unpreserved errors.' The
Supreme Court's recent unpreserved error jurisprudence has only further
emphasized that the appellate court's prime focus for determining
whether an error meets Atkinson's serious error standard must indeed be
the facts of the case.' 72 Left unguided, this kind of judgment is fraught
with danger because it depends heavily on appellate judges' subjective
concepts of justice and fairness.
1 7 3
B. A Proposed Reformulation
Therefore, to realign the plain error analysis with its common law
precedents, the text of Rule 52(b), and the rationales supporting review
of unpreserved errors, this section proposes a new formulation of the
plain error doctrine:
In a criminal case, a court may correct an error that occurred at
trial or sentencing, even though that error was not brought to the
attention of the trial court. The court must correct an error that, in its
discretionary judgment, seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings. In determining whether an
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings, the court shall explicitly consider (1) the pur-
pose of the right impaired by the error on the fairness and reliability
of the judgment and sentence, and (2) the seriousness of the error's
consequences in impairing this purpose in the factual context of the
case.
170. Id. (footnotes omitted).
171. Id. at 1190.
172. E.g., Puckett v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1433 (2009) ("The fourth prong is meant
to be applied on a case-specific and fact-intensive basis.").
173. See Martineau, supra note 76, at 1058, 1061.
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This proposed rule has four main features. First, because the moti-
vating rationale for allowing review of unpreserved errors in criminal
cases is the public interest in ensuring that criminal defendants receive a
fair and reliable trial, 174 this rule focuses squarely on the seriousness of
the asserted error. Unlike the Olano formulation, this proposed rule does
not separately consider whether the error appears to be harmless or
whether the error was "clear" or "obvious." While these considerations
may still be pertinent and may even be decisive in certain cases, the
appellate court's task will ultimately be to determine, using any perti-
nent consideration, whether an error meets the Atkinson serious error
standard.
Second, although the appellate court may consider all pertinent
facts, the rule focuses the appellate court's attention on the subset of the
facts pertinent to the error. It emphasizes that the appellate court's
inquiry must first determine the purpose of the right impaired by the
error independent of the facts of the case. Then, the appellate court can
examine the facts of the case to determine if other aspects of the trial
achieved this purpose in spite of the error. This will deter appellate
courts from reassessing the defendant's guilt in favor of considering how
important the right impaired by the error was to ensuring the fair trial
and sentencing of the defendant.
For instance, in a case where the error involved the erroneous
exclusion of evidence, the appellate court might conclude that such an
error results in an unfair trial whenever the evidence could have created
a doubt in the minds of the jurors that was not credibly suggested by
other evidence. Then the appellate court would examine the record to
see whether the excluded evidence met this criterion. This approach
guides the appellate court's attention away from an independent assess-
ment of the defendant's guilt and toward a focused analysis of the
record. Although there is no way to examine the effect of the error on
the case without a close examination of the case itself, 75 this method
aims to clarify how the role of the appellate court involves a "form of
judgment" 176 distinct from the kind the jury exercises in convicting the
defendant (or the kind the court exercises in sentencing the defendant).
Third, the proposed rule calls for the appellate court to explicitly
detail its analysis of the error to ensure that (1) the court creates a refer-
ence point for future cases that deal with the same issue; (2) the parties
174. See supra Section II.
175. See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 35 (1988) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[Any application of the plain-error doctrine necessarily includes some
form of prejudice inquiry .... ); Edwards, supra note 167, at 1187.




can determine whether the court "got it right," ' and, therefore whether
to petition for further appellate review or reconsideration; and (3) the
judges on the court can satisfy themselves, as much as possible, that the
court's opinion accurately appreciates the significance of error and its
consequences under the case's particular facts.
Fourth, while this proposed reformulation eliminates the discretion
that appellate courts have to refuse to remedy an error, it still calls for a
different kind of judicial discretion by directing appellate courts to eval-
uate the seriousness of the error in light of the case's factual conse-
quences. As other scholars have recognized, judicial discretion can serve
the appellate court as a method of fashioning new rules of law in areas
where the rules are either not clear or not widely accepted. 178 When the
legal issues are new, a measure of discretion allows the appellate court
to focus first on identifying the relevant considerations and seeing how
they apply in particular cases.179 Over time, various appellate courts will
identify the full range of pertinent considerations and develop
approaches for balancing them. 180 At the outset, when the rules are not
yet well-established, courts' decisions may be seen as more discretion-
ary. 81 But, as rules develop, decisions that once were an exercise of
discretion become traditional questions of law. 8
This approach also better harnesses the tremendous intellectual
power of the judiciary. When no consensus has yet emerged regarding a
novel legal issue, the understanding that courts' early analytical
approaches to deciding the issue are an exercise of a limited judicial
discretion prevents one appellate court (or panel of a court) from fore-
closing another appellate court (or panel) from addressing the issue in
another way.' 83 This gives various courts significant independence from
one another as rules develop, and emerging cognitive science strongly
supports the notion that "the best collective decisions are the product of
disagreement and contest." 184
This approach also gives appellate courts some flexibility to deal
with the kinds of errors known to cause wrongful convictions. As empir-
ical evidence mounts about the sources of trial errors that lead to incor-
177. Cf supra note 142 and accompanying text (discussing and citing cases where appellate
courts engaged in merely conclusory analyses of unpreserved error claims).
178. See, e.g., Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary






184. See JAMES SUROWIECKi, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS XiX, 161-68 (2004).
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rect convictions, appellate courts can direct heightened attention to these
kinds of errors and their effects on the trial process.
Thus, under this proposed reformulation, the appellate court will
continue to exercise a level of discretionary judgment to craft appropri-
ate rules when the rules applicable to the facts are unclear. However, as
rules develop, appellate courts and defendants will be able to use and
refine them in the common law tradition. 18 5 And, rather than relying on
subjective considerations and unguided discretion to control the fre-
quency of review of unpreserved error as the Olano formulation does,
186
the proposed rule would foster the development of standards to guide the
appellate court in its decision to review an unpreserved error, while leav-
ing open the possibility that the existing rules are incomplete or even
incorrect until the rules are validated through application in many cases
over time.
IV. CONCLUSION
"To clear the confusion reflected in the Court of Appeals' appli-
cation of the plain-error standard. . . this Court should ... formulate
a test for plain error that articulates the prejudice standard to be
applied . .. ."
United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 36 (1988) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the Flores-Perez case
described in the introduction, the Ninth Circuit provided an apt demon-
stration of the difficulties inherent in the decision of whether to remedy
an unpreserved error. The dissent pointed out the two most worrisome
aspects of the defendant's trial: (1) the prosecutor told the jury that there
was a lengthy report about the defendant that, "according to the rules of
evidence, you will not be seeing," thereby implying that the prosecutor
had special knowledge of the defendant's guilt; and (2) during closing
argument (before which the trial court had already given its final instruc-
tions to the jury), the prosecutor told the jury that they were "no longer
obligated to presume innocence." '187 The majority did not specifically
185. See Martineau, supra note 76, at 1033-34.
186. Cf. Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561,
1565-66 (2003) (contrasting the exercise of discretion that courts exercise in the absence of a
controlling rule in an area that "defies the development of legal 'rules"' from the discretion courts
exercise when merely making decisions in an area that "sensibly implies limitations on second-
guessing" from a higher court). As the rules remain new, the Supreme Court may indeed be well-
advised to avoid interfering with the development of the rules, but, over time, the Supreme Court
can exercise its supervisory authority to coordinate and clarify the rule to ensure consistency
within the courts of appeal.
187. United States v. Flores-Perez, 311 F. App'x. 69, 71 (9th Cir. 2009) (Kleinfeld, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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consider the effect of these errors. 188 Rather, even though the Flores-
Perez court agreed that these statements were obvious errors, it con-
cluded that the errors did not meet Olano's requirement that the error
"'seriously affect[ ] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings' given the overwhelming evidence of guilt and [the defen-
dant's] striking lack of credibility at trial. ' "89
Under this article's proposed rule, the majority opinion may indeed
be correct on the first issue. If the majority is correct that the evidence
was overwhelming, the prosecutor's allusion to the existence of addi-
tional evidence was merely superfluous. Unlike the erroneous exclusion
of defense evidence, which might have sown doubt in the mind of the
jury about the defendant's guilt, this kind of error probably does not
introduce much doubt that, but for the error, the jury would have reached
a different conclusion. Even so, under the proposed rule, the appellate
court would have been explicitly required to consider the consequence
of the error in the factual context of the case. This requirement would
have prompted the majority to explain why the evidence was over-
whelming in spite of the dissent's view to the contrary,1 90 thereby reduc-
ing the possibility that the majority misunderstood the quality and
quantity of evidence on every element necessary to prove the defen-
dant's guilt. A more elaborate explanation also would have increased the
likelihood that the form of judgment reflected in the opinion was truly
an analysis of the error rather than a reassessment of the defendant's
guilt. Also, it would have also provided a more complete analysis to
guide future courts and defendants considering similar issues.
The majority's opinion is less persuasive with respect to the prose-
cutor's comment to the jury that it could disregard the presumption of
innocence once it began its deliberations. The opinion is less persuasive
because the error did not relate to the evidence; rather, it related to
whether the jury had been properly charged with the applicable law and
whether it applied that law during its deliberations. 91 Thus, the major-
ity's suggestion that the overwhelming evidence prevented this error
from "'seriously affect[ing] the fairness, integrity or public reputa-
tion'"192 of the proceeding seems facially inapposite. After all, how can
evidence, regardless of its weight, moot the issue of whether the jury
properly understood the applicable law? 193
188. See id. at 70-71 (majority opinion).
189. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
190. See id. at 71 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
191. See id.
192. Id. at 70 (majority opinion) (citation omitted).
193. See TRAYNOR, supra note 114, at 22 ("Even overwhelming evidence in support of a
verdict does not necessarily dispel the risk that an error may have played a substantial part in the
20131
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Under the proposed rule, the court would have been compelled to
explicitly consider the jury's written instructions, verdict forms, or other
information in the record indicating whether the jury was properly
apprised of the law. If the jury was indeed clear about the law notwith-
standing the prosecutor's comments, then the majority was correct that
the error did not rise to the level of serious error. Even if the jury was
not correctly apprised of the law, the proposed rule would require the
court to then consider whether the error caused serious consequences in
the factual context of the case. Sometimes, even an incorrect statement
of the law would not create a serious error; for instance, the incorrect
statement might relate to an element of the crime the defendant never
contested. In the absence of this kind of analysis, however, the Flores-
Perez opinion appears to primarily reflect the majority's opinion that the
defendant was guilty.
This article's proposed solution would aid the federal appellate
courts in ensuring that their analyses focus on the seriousness of the
error, avoid guilt-based judging, and develop precedents that will guide
future courts and defendants in determining the merit of providing a
remedy for unpreserved errors. Given the evident injustice of incorrect
convictions and the new empirical evidence about their prevalence, the
need for closer, more disciplined scrutiny of unpreserved errors is real
and urgent.
deliberation of the jury and thus contributed to the actual verdict reached, for the jury may have
reached its verdict because of the error. ... )
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